The Concepts of Virtue and Misbehavior in Ibn Sina's Moral Philosophy

Abstract

This chapter systematically examines Ibn Sīnā’s moral philosophy in terms of the definition of ethics, its fundamental issues, sources, virtues, and vices. Ibn Sīnā defines ethics as a branch of practical philosophy that deals with the virtues the soul must acquire and the vices it must avoid. He divides ethics into theoretical and practical ethics: theoretical ethics concerns the relationship between human beings and God, while practical ethics focuses on virtuous conduct in daily life. Following Aristotle, Ibn Sīnā describes ethics as a settled disposition (malakah) in the soul and identifies virtue as the mean (tawassuṭ) between excess (ifrāṭ) and deficiency (tafrīṭ). Ibn Sīnā’s moral thought is shaped by the influence of Plato, Aristotle, and al-Fārābī. From Plato he adopts the four cardinal virtues (wisdom, courage, temperance, justice) and the harmony among the parts of the soul; from Aristotle he takes the eudaimonistic teleology and the doctrine of the mean; from al-Fārābī he inherits the close link between ethics and politics, the significance of education, and the view that morals are acquired through habit (ʿādah). According to Ibn Sīnā, morality is acquired through education; good is identical with being, while evil is essentially non-existence. Evil arises in the sublunary realm as a form of deficiency and is explained within the framework of emanation theory (ṣudūr). Justice is regarded as the highest virtue, emerging from the harmonious operation of all other virtues. The ultimate aim in Ibn Sīnā’s moral philosophy is eternal happiness (saʿādah abadiyyah), attained through the perfection of theoretical and practical intellect. This happiness becomes possible when the soul liberates itself from dependence on matter and becomes a mirror reflecting truth.